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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates and interprets returns to education for three sub-sectors of labour 
market by gender in Pakistan, using the most recent data set of Pakistan Social and 
Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2004-05. The results show two 
distinctive features of Pakistani education, the high apparent returns to female education 
outside agriculture, and the remarkable increase of returns with successive levels of 
education, are to be explained primarily by two departures from the basic Mincer model; 
generally poor quality primary schooling and family unwillingness to invest in female 
education because of lack of earning opportunities. There is some signaling in Pakistani 
education investment but mainly the education is productivity-enhancing investment in 
human capital, according to a comparison of self-employed and paid employed earnings 
equations . Returns to public spending of education are extremely high, suggesting very 
considerable state underinvestment. The policy challenge is in the low wages and high 
education in the female paid employment sector, and the low participation rate. 
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Introduction 
 
Empirical estimates of returns to investment in human capital have long been 
dominated by the demand side formulation of Jacob Mincer (1958) (Rosen 1992). 
A rational individual with perfect foresight chooses schooling up to the point 
where the wage gains of an extra year’s schooling are offset by the additional 
cost (assumed to be mainly the earnings foregone). Then as long as the direct 
costs of schooling are small and the period of earning is long, the proportionate 
increase in wages from an extra year of schooling equals the rate of return.  
 
The Mincer model has provided the framework for many estimates of the rate of 
returns to education in Pakistan (see Aslam (2007) for a review). All but one of 
these studies has estimated returns to education only for paid employment. Yet 
little more than half of the total labour force is engaged in this sector. The 
remainder are self-employed (non-agricultural) or working in agriculture. So far 
only one study (Kingdon et al., 2007) in Pakistan has estimated returns to 
education in all these three sectors of labour market using Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey (PIHS) 1998 -99 data. Moreover, they have divided the sample 
into young (16-30 years olds) men and women and old (31-70 years old) men and 
women.  In the present study an attempt has been made to estimate and to 
interpret returns to education for three sub-sectors of labour market by gender in 
Pakistan, using the most recent data set of Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2004-05. 
 
If earnings returns are persistently high in one sector we need to know why. For 
in a market economy, high returns in any activity attract more resources, which 
drive down rewards in that sector. Persistent excess returns point to some barrier 
to the flow of resources. A much discussed hindrance in the Mincer literature is 
ability. If high ability is scarce, and high ability is necessary to take full 
advantage of a large number of years of schooling, some of the higher earnings 
associated with schooling will be properly attributable to ability rather than to 
the schooling. Consequently, increasing schooling for lower ability individuals 
will not generate the same returns. 
 
A number of other possible departures from the simplest Mincer model 
assumptions may influence the interpretation of the earnings/schooling 
correlations. Preferences or choices in this demand model may be conflated with 
other constraints, particularly those of finance and those imposed by the family, 
often the decision-taker in practice. Pure time preference may be responsible for 
choosing fewer, rather than more, years of schooling, but so too may be the 
inability to borrow money for upkeep in more schooling, because of lack of 
credit. Family decision takers, regarding younger family members as sources of 
collective income, can be critical. The future earnings of these members could be 
discounted heavily on the grounds that they will become independent of the 
family and no longer contribute. In some societies this could be particularly true 
of female children.  
 
On the supply side, schooling available is typically provided by a political 
process, which may not always create the ideal education options. For example 
primary school age children cannot be expected to travel far, so their early 
education is constrained by local availability of schooling. The cumulative nature 
of education means that the number of years of schooling chosen may be 
influenced by the quality of earlier education. If the quality of schooling supplied 
is not homogenous, then some children, receiving low quality education, may be 
prevented from proceeding to the higher levels of education that their abilities 
and preferences warrant. 
 
In this paper we contend that two distinctive features of Pakistani education, the 
high apparent returns to female education outside agriculture, and the 
remarkable increase of returns with successive levels of education, are to be 
explained primarily by two departures from the basic Mincer model; generally 
poor quality primary schooling and family unwillingness to invest in female 
education because of lack of earning opportunities.  
 
We show that the earnings returns to public spending on education are colossal, 
holding constant years of schooling - because so little is spent on primary 
education. We go on to show that the strong nonlinearity of the years of 
schooling function stems from the highly variable quality of early schooling and 
low spending upon it. More spending in earlier years to raise average quality 
there so that returns at least match world averages would be far more effective 
than increasing HE expenditure.  
 
High measured returns to female education we show stem from a combination of 
much lower workforce participation than males and fewer average years in the 
labour force. Actual returns are much lower. Apparently higher returns are 
necessary to compensate for the shorter period, and lower probability, of 
earning, that are not factored into the basic model. If the education supply side 
were the principal constraint then educated female earnings would be higher 
than those of educated males, whereas the reverse is the case. The constraint we 
suggest is not on the supply of educated females but on the opportunities that 
create the demand for them. Increasing these opportunities is more fundamental 
than increasing investment. However we concede that this argument does not 
take into account other important reasons for boosting investment in female 
education.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the model of the paper. 
Section 2 discusses data and its descriptive statistics. Section 3highlights the 
specifications and estimation procedures. In section 4, the estimated results are 
presented. And section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
 
1. The Model 
 
Following Harmon et al (2003), the human capital model underlying the Mincer 
specification is that the individual invests in education optimally. That is, up to 
the point where the present value of the extra earnings from a little more 
schooling should equal the cost, primarily the wage that would have been earned 
over the extra schooling period. 
T-s 
?  (ws-ws-1)/(1+r)t = ws-1 + cs                                  …(1) 
t=1 
where T is the maximum  potential number of years in the  labour force, s is years 
of schooling, w is earnings where the s subscripts indicates the number of years 
of schooling that are associated with the earnings and cs is the direct net cost of 
schooling (negative if the pleasure outweighs the pain and private financial 
outlays). r is the private internal rate of return to schooling investment. Where 
female labour force participation is lower than male, in effect T is lower and 
therefore so are returns for given earnings. 
 
To derive the Mincer equation T must be large for all individuals and cs must be 
small.  Then  
 
   r ˜ (ws-ws-1)/ ws-1  = log ws - log ws-1                               … (2) 
 
The rate of return to another year of schooling is the proportionate increase in 
earnings consequent upon taking that extra year.  If T is not large then the 
formula (2) must be modified to   
r /k= (ws-ws-1)/ ws-1  = log ws - log ws-1                           …(2a)                        
where k = 1-(1/(1+r))t 
 
The standard Mincerian human capital earnings function also includes 
experience after schooling, to which returns rise at a diminishing rate. A range of 
other controls are often included as well.  
 
In the present paper our basic equation is that from (2) a one year increase in 
schooling times the internal rate of return to schooling, controlling for other 
influences, gives the proportionate change in earnings.  
 
  Log wi = lnymi = f(Si, Xi, Zi, ui )                            …(3) 
 
where, lnymi is the log of monthly earnings for an individual i, S is  years of 
schooling completed, Xi is a vector of personal characteristics such as experience, 
experience squared, and gender.  In addition we allow that individuals differ in 
their leisure preferences and labour supplies by including a ‘days worked’ 
measure. In the supply of education (in Z), State expenditure per school age 
person determines the average quality of years of (public) schooling1, although 
the spending (but not the quality) is ignored in the private investment decision 
modelled by the Mincer equation. Since other factors influencing earnings may 
differ with the same areas over which state spending varies, controls for these 
factors must also be included in Z. ui is the random error term measuring the 
impact of unobserved variables.  
 
A modification to (3) is that if the workers in question do not work for ‘a long 
period’, from (2a) the coefficient on schooling is the (return/k) rather than 
simply the rate of return. When r=0.1 and t=10, k=0.61; the rate of return is three 
fifths of the coefficient on schooling. 
 
Conventionally the log of earnings is assumed linear in years of schooling. This 
assumption is here tested because of the interest in the cumulative nature of 
education. Linearity presupposes an adequate supply side. If the quality of 
investment in schooling on the supply side is on average low and variable then 
only a small proportion of graduates from primary education will be in a 
position to take advantage of secondary education (and similarly for tertiary 
education). Consequently the returns to successive layers of education will be 
higher because of the increasingly restricted pool of individuals who can benefit. 
 
We employ multiple treatment functions to test this possibility. In the single 
treatment model, schooling is defined as years of education completed assuming 
returns are the same at every level. In the multiple treatment models the rate of 
return to education is calculated separately for the different education levels or 
qualifications.  
 
Lnymi = ß0 + ßp prim + ßm mid + ßs sec + ßhs hsec+ ßtr ter + ßx Xi+ ßz Zi + u i             
…..(4) 
 
                                                
1 Actual current expenditure incurred on education by the provinces for the year 2002—03.  
where ‘prim’ is a dummy for primary (5 years) being the highest level of 
education completed, ‘mid’ is highest level completed being middle school (6-8 
years), ‘sec’ is highest level secondary (9-10 years), ‘hsec’ is higher secondary (11-
12 years) and ‘ter’ is tertiary (13+ years). The coefficients associated with prim, 
mid, sec, hsec and ter in equation (4) indicates the increase in earnings with 
education at the respective levels.  
 
Linearity implies the bj coefficients are proportional to the years of schooling at 
each level; ßm = (8/5) ßp, for instance2. The average rate of return rj per year of 
schooling for the jth level of education can be computed as rj = (b j - bj-1)/Yj , where 
Yj is the number of years of schooling at jth level of education.  For example if ßp 
=  ßm, the return to five  years of primary schooling is the same as that for three 
years of middle schooling on top of the primary schooling.  In this case there 
would be no return to middle schooling. If ßp = 0.2 and ßm= 0.5, the rate of return 
to middle schooling is 10 percent per year (0.3/3), compared with a 4 percent 
(0.2/5) return to a primary year. 
 
Another supply side influence on earnings is the curriculum. A curriculum for 
example that emphasises Arabic when Arabic is not spoken or much used in 
trade might not enhance human capital but persons who were good at Arabic 
might nevertheless be in high demand by employers if such achievement is a 
signal of particular ability3.  Criticisms of the Pakistan state school curriculum 
make tests of this signalling hypothesis, compared with the human capital 
concept, especially important (for example Nayyar and Salim 2003). Schooling 
that does not add to human capital can nonetheless increase wages if it identifies 
the ability of individuals. 
 
The self-employed do not need to signal ability to themselves. They have no 
reason to pay themselves more if their extra schooling does not increase their 
                                                
2 Assuming the same age at retirement, a person who enters the workforce at age 11 will work for 
10 more years than someone who enters at age 21. Consequently the person with only primary 
education will have ten more years of earning and failure to take this into account will bias the 
rate of return comparison of primary education with tertiary in favour of the second. With a seven 
percent internal rate of return and 50 years of working life for the primary educated individual and  
40 years for the tertiary educated person, the ratio of the primary schooling coefficient to the 
tertiary coefficient should be multiplied by about 1.035 to obtain the true ratio of returns. The bias 
is quite small.  
3 So judged Thomas Babbington Macaulay in his 1833 speech ‘If, instead of learning Greek, we 
learned the Cherokee, the man who understood the Cherokee best, who made the most correct 
and melodious Cherokee verses--who comprehended most accurately the effect of the Cherokee 
particles--would generally be a superior man to him who was destitute of these 
accomplishments.’ Berriedale Keith (1922 226-265). 
 
productivity. So a comparison of employed and self-employed earnings is a test 
of the value of the curriculum and the human capital model. If the two sectors 
have divergent earnings/schooling relations, there is evidence of signalling. A 
caveat is that if earning ability is perfectly matched with years of schooling then 
the test would not discriminate , but this seems unlikely.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data set used in this analysis is the Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2004-05. It consists of nationally representative 
sample of 80,000 households and 500,635 individuals. The survey was conducted 
using a two-stage stratified random sampling approach. The survey collected the 
information on the years of education of each member of the household, 
cognitive ability, employment type, occupation and industry.  
 
Table 1: Labour force participation rate 
 
Age groups  Male Female  
15-30 68.1 13.0 
31-45 95.5 17.0 
46 and above 81.0 14.0 
Total  77.7 13.9 
 
A distinctive characteristic of the Pakistani labour market, according to this 
sample, is the very low participation of women (Table 1). Moreover, as Table 2 
shows, more than half of the female participants are effectively unemployed 
(unpaid family workers). Those that do find paid work receive on average half 
the average monthly earnings of males in the full sample (table 2), consistent 
with very limited labour market opportunities for females.  
 
There are significant differences in average monthly earnings across the three 
sub-sectors of the labour market, but it is not entirely clear whether the figures 
are comparable. Earnings in agriculture should not include returns to land and 
self-employed earnings should not include returns to capital if they are to be on 
the same basis. Otherwise they will overstate true labour returns.  In addition 
agricultural income is likely to be highly seasonal and therefore monthly 
earnings could include a substantial element of estimation. Subject to these 
caveats, self-employed and agricultural male worker’s earnings are greater than 
the workers in paid employment sector. By contrast earnings of female workers 
are highest in paid employment, but still well below male earnings. Les than half 
the sample who could have reported earnings in fact do so. 
 
Average years of schooling of paid- and self-employed workers are higher than 
those of agricultural workers.  In agriculture the average is 7.2 (male) and 5.8 
(female) whereas for the paid employment and the self-employed average years 
of schooling are 9.1 (male) and 10.9 (female), and 8.4 (male) and 7.8 (female), 
respectively. Females have almost two more years of schooling than males in 
paid employment, even though they are much lower paid.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (persons aged 15-65) 
Total Paid employed Self-employed Agriculture Unpaid family 
helper 
 
Variables 
Male Female Male Female Male  Female Male Female  Male Female 
Monthly 
earnings 
5585 
(11809) 
2757 
(4836) 
4859 
(11024) 
2980 
(5008) 
7057  
(12580) 
2160 
(4091) 
5676 
(15604) 
1853 
(3688) 
0 0 
Log earnings 8.26 
(0.77) 
7.335 
(1.02) 
8.16 
(0.71) 
7.44 
(1.01) 
8.48 
(0.79) 
7.12 
(0.77) 
8.10 
(1.03) 
7.07 
(0.97) 
0 0 
Years of 
Schooling 
8.53 
(3.45) 
8.38 
(3.39) 
9.01 
(3.81) 
10.87 
(3.97) 
8.41 
(3.45) 
7.82 
(3.63) 
7.19 
(3.16) 
5.84 
(2.63) 
7.77 
(3.03) 
6.42 
(2.95) 
Age  32.46 
(14.08) 
32.18 
(13.44) 
33.19 
(11.94)  
31.80 
(11.65) 
37.18  
(12.61) 
31.86 
(11.77) 
41.48 
(13.05) 
37.62 
(11.31)  
23.25 
(8.31) 
32.34  
(12.69) 
Exp 16.44 
(13.26) 
13.13 
(11.45) 
18.42 
(11.39)  
13.32 
(9.68) 
22.43  
(12.66) 
15.32 
(10.47) 
26.01 
(13.90) 
21.97 
(12.42)  
10.02 
(6.92) 
12.80  
(9.48) 
Maths skills 0.73 
(0.44) 
0.45 
0.50) 
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.72 
(0.44) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Literacy  0.64 
(0.48) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
Rural 0.62 
(0.49) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.95 
(0.21) 
0.76 
(0.42) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
Married 0.57 
(0.49) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.79 
(0.40) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
Punjab 0.42 
(0.49) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
Sindh 0.26 
(0.44) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
NWFP 0.18 
(0.38) 
0.20 
0.40) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Balochistan 0.15 
(0.35) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Observations 138750 134401 47193 6237 23754 1734 20774 1322 16155 9357  
Earnings 
observations 
73195 8230 46686 6107 23106 1670 3278 325 0 0 
Source: Pakistan Social Living and Standards Measurement Survey, 2004 -05 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Paid employed includes all defined as paid employee, self-employed 
includes those who have their own business (non-agriculture) or they are entrepreneurs, agricultural workers are defined 
as own cultivator, tenant, sharecropper and livestock owners.  
It is worth noting that the average years of schooling amongst unemployed 
workers is greater than for agricultural workers, even though agricultural 
workers earn more than those in paid employment. Patterns of literacy and 
numeracy are similar to schooling. Percentages of literates and those with basic 
maths skills are higher in self-employment and paid employment than in the 
agriculture sector. 
 
These data indicate that the main difference in earnings for male workers is 
between self-employed and agricultural, while for female workers it is between 
self-employed and paid-employment. In contrast to earnings, the principal 
divergence for schooling is between the self-employed and paid employed for 
both sexes on one hand, and agricultural workers and unpaid family helpers on 
the other. This suggests that schooling influences in which occupational groups 
an individual ends up in. Since unemployed male individuals possess the mean 
schooling levels of self- and wage-employed workers, they are apparently in a 
queue for suitable job opportunities in the labour market. 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of educational attainment by gender and by the 
three main labour markets sectors in Pakistan. As hinted at in Table 2, wage 
earners with tertiary education are concentrated in the paid employment sector. 
More than one third of female paid employees are graduates, but female paid 
employees in the sample amount to less than one tenth of males. The sample of 
Table 3 is well under half the size of Table 2. 
 
Table 3: Level of Education Attained by gender and Occupations (Percentage) 
Paid Employment Self-employed Agriculture   
Education 
levels  
Total  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  
No & less 
than 5 years 
Schooling 
 
8.98 
 
9.21 
 
6.42 
 
9.62 
 
9.47 
 
12.56 
 
14.82 
 
14.67 
 
21.91 
Primary 16.39 16.96 10.46 20.00 19.65 28.01 30.33 29.97 46.45 
Middle 18.50 19.47 8.39 21.60 21.75 18.46 20.66 20.81 13.66 
Secondary 27.20 27.52 23.86 29.82 30.13 23.04 24.75 24.98 14.75 
Higher 
Secondary 
8.30 7.78 13.67 7.01 7.00 7.20 4.28 4.31 2.73 
Tertiary 20.63 19.08 37.20 11.95 12.00 10.73 5.16 5.26 0.5 
Observations 34273 31281 2992 17352 16588  764 8395 8212 183 
Source: Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM), 2004-05 
 
The percentage of workers having only middle and secondary education is 
highest in the self-employed sector. Agriculture has the highest percentage of 
workers with only primary education. Almost 50 percent of the female 
agricultural labour force received only primary education and 22 percent have 
none or less than 5 years of education. This female sample is small (183), even 
compared with the 1322 female agricultural workers of Table 2.  
 
3. Specification and Estimation 
 
As noted in the previous section, Pakistan’s labour markets are segmented 
between male and female workers and between paid employment, self-
employment and agriculture. We therefore estimate earnings functions 
separately for each, taking OLS as a benchmark. However, OLS estimates 
potentially suffer from sample selectivity and endogeneity biases.  
 
In view of the large number of non-completions, possibly those that answered 
the earnings question are not a random draw from the population. If so the 
earnings equations could be biased. Analogously the small proportion of females 
of working age who are employed or self-employed in market activities may not 
constitute a random sample of all Pakistani women. Consequently inferences 
about market returns to female schooling estimated from uncorrected equations 
could be misleading – if for example those working are more productive than 
those not.  A third selection bias might arise because Mincerian earnings 
functions are typically estimated for sub-samples such as wage earners. In 
developing countries paid employees may not be representative of the  majority 
or substantial minority of the population who are self-employed. If education 
determines whether a person is in the paid employment sector or not, an OLS 
estimate of the education earnings relation in paid employment will be biased 
upwards. 
 
We use Heckman’s correction for sample selectivity for each of the three possible 
biases. Household demographic variables such as ‘head’ and ‘married’, that will 
influence reporting of earnings, female labour force participation and 
occupational choice,  are here used to satisfy the  exclusion restriction in the first 
stage probit.  
 
The original Mincerian equation did not include any measure of ability, 
motivation or taste for education. Omitted variables bias estimates, when 
correlated with other independent variables. Omitting ‘ability’ will cause OLS 
coefficients to overestimate the returns to schooling if individuals with higher 
income-generating capacities are also individuals who choose more education 
(Ichino and Winter-Ember, 1999). The typical solution is the instrumental 
variables (IV) methodology. This procedure at the same time addresses 
measurement error.   
 
We use as instruments variables problems/reasons for not studying. Education 
is instrumented using six variables: dtooexp (‘education too expensive ’), dtoofar 
(‘schools are too far away’), dwah (‘had to help at home’), dhtw (‘had to help 
with work’), dpna (‘parents did not approve’) and dcnw (‘child not willing to 
attend school’).  
 
We also attempt to address the contribution of family decision making and 
characteristics to schooling and earnings by estimating a family fixed effects 
regression of earnings. To the extent that unobserved traits, such as ability, 
motivation, or taste for education, are shared within the family, their effects will 
be netted out in a family differenced model.  It is unlikely that unobserved traits 
are identical across family members but they are likely to be more similar within 
a family than between families. Thus, family fixed effects estimation of earnings 
functions gives rates of return to schooling with reduced bias (Kingdon et al., 
2007).             
 
For the wage equations, observations were dropped if the respondent was less 
than 15 years or above 65 years of age.  Earnings functions are estimated on sub-
samples of paid employees (47193 males and 6237 females), self-employed (23754 
males and 1734 females) and agricultural workers (20774 males and 1322 
females).   
 
The dependent variable in earnings functions is the natural log of monthly 
earnings (lnym). The definitions of the variables used in the earning function are 
given in table A1 in the Appendix.  The education variable has been specified in 
two ways, as years of completed education (school) and as education dummy 
variables representing various levels of education (prim, mid, sec, hsec and ter). 
The reference category for the dummy variables is individuals with zero and less 
than five years of education.  
 
The earning equations include experience and its quadratic term (EXP and EXP2). 
This variable is computed as (age - years of education - 5) on the grounds that 
individuals start schooling at the age of 5 and enter the labour market after 
education is completed. The vector of other variables in the earning equation 
includes dummy variables for the regions and provinces. 
 
4. Estimating Earning Functions and Rates of Return 
On the grounds of their robustness we first consider OLS estimates of equation 3 
by occupation and gender in table 4. 
 
4.1 The Basic Estimates: OLS  
 
A table 4 shows that returns to an additional year of schooling are apparently 
greater for females than males in paid employment; the returns to an additional 
year of schooling are 9.2 percent and 14 percent for men and women 
respectively. These returns are higher than the estimates of Kingdon et al., 2007, 
(which were 3.3 percent for men and 14.9 percent for young women in the same 
sector), possibly because of their more restricted age range. This large and 
significant gender differences in Pakistan cannot be attributed to the scarcity of 
educated women; otherwise their wages would not be lower, as observed in 
section 2.  Instead as the labour force participation rates also noted in section 2 
indicate, the low probability or short duration of employment requires a high 
apparent rate of return compared with males, to provide an equivalent actual 
return.  
 
With female employment at 10.5 percent of male, this could be accounted for by 
females having only a 10.5 percent chance of being in the employed workforce. 
In which case, actual returns for those in the workforce must be adjusted to take 
account of those outside, by multiplying by the probability. This leads to a far 
lower financial return to female schooling than to male. Alternatively females 
could be assumed to be in the labour force for the first 10.5 percent of the years of 
the average male, say four years. Because female earnings with this method are 
assumed to occur sooner, the discrepancy between males and female returns is 
smaller but still much larger than necessary to account for the observed 
difference. Earnings peak at 31 years and 37 years of experience respectively for 
males and females in the paid employment sector.  
 
In the self employment sector, the returns to an additional year of education are 
8.3 percent for men and 10.3 percent for women4. That the returns are closer 
might suggest that women are crowded in to the self-employed sector because of 
inadequate opportunities in paid employment and in agriculture. However, the 
small sample (745 in self-employment compared with 2950 in paid employment) 
contradicts the crowding interpretation- if sampling procedures are appropriate .  
A more plausible possibility is that self-employed women work for more years 
and in this respect are more comparable with men than in paid employment.  
 
The returns to education in agriculture sector are 7.1 percent for males and 4.3 
percent for females (a very small sample, reflecting very few opportunities). The 
coefficient of experience indicates substantial increase in wages with each 
additional year for males in each sector of the labour market but not for females 
outside paid employment.  
                                                
4 These returns are greater for men than the estimates of Kingdon et al., 2007, which were 4.8 
percent and 10.5 percent for young men and women respectively. 
 A greater labour supply at the individual level is a significant contributor to 
monthly earnings, the largest effect being for self-employed females, consistent 
with this sector being the only one where females are not discrimi nated against. 
An extra day worked by self-employed females increases their earnings by 4.5 
percent, whereas for self-employed males, an extra day’s work boosts earnings 
by only 0.8 percent. The coefficients on NWD (number of days worked during 
last month) are positive and statistically significant for all the sectors of labour 
market for both males and females, excepting females in agriculture.  
 
Table 4: Earnings and years of schooling (OLS estimates) – dependent variable 
lnym 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables Male Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
School 0.092* 
(101.52) 
0.140* 
(35.58) 
0.083* 
(49.07) 
0.103* 
(10.11) 
0.071* 
(7.74) 
0.043 
(0.75) 
Exp 0.062* 
(59.92) 
0.072* 
(15.93) 
0.056* 
(33.23) 
0.021** 
(1.92) 
0.058* 
(7.25) 
0.019 
(0.44) 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-38.41) 
-0.001* 
(-8.59) 
-0.001* 
(-22.43) 
0.0001 
(0.35) 
-0.001 * 
(-5.88) 
0.00004 
(0.06) 
NDW 0.014* 
(17.15) 
0.034* 
(11.57) 
0.008* 
(5.43) 
0.045* 
(8.40) 
0.020* 
(3.40) 
0.048 
(1.38) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(14.22) 
0.002* 
(7.51) 
0.001* 
(8.97) 
0.004** 
(3.61) 
0.001  
(1.50) 
0.003 
(0.70) 
Constant  6.047* 
(170.58) 
3.781* 
(24.45) 
6.577* 
(93.75) 
2.521* 
(3.59) 
6.020* 
(16.78) 
3.190 
(0.90) 
R2 0.40 0.47 0.27 0.29 0.10 0.17 
F-statistic 2551.89 323.45 731.50 37.43 19.21 1.31 
Observations  30852 2950 16080 745 1404 52 
Chow test (F-
test) 
889.33   10.40   
p-value 0.00   0.00   
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. T-statistics is 
in parentheses. Dummy variables for provinces and regional dummies also included in all 
regressions. 
 
Provincial educational expenditures per school age population (EDUEXP) are 
also positive and statistically significant for both male and female in all sectors of 
the labour market, except for agriculture, where it is positive but not significant. 
Since the variable is measured in money units (rupees), the average rate of return 
to this state investment in the quality of education (holding years of schooling 
constant) can be computed directly. Taking the average monthly earnings from 
table 2 and the coefficients of provincial education expenditure per school age 
person from table 4, the average returns for a rupee increase per head are; 
 
paid employed (male)   = 0.001*4859 = 4.9 ,  
paid employed (female) = 0.002*2980=6.0, 
self employed (male) = 0.001*7057=7.1     
self employed (female) = 0.004*2160=8.6 
agriculture  (male)= 0.001*5657=5.7 (not significantly greater than zero) 
agriculture (female)= 0.003*1853=5.6 (not significantly greater than zero) 
 
These returns as percentages are colossal (4.9=490 percent) and can only be 
possible if the existing quality of education is extremely low. Interestingly they 
are greater for the self-employed than the employed. 
 
According to human capital theory, education directly increases individual 
productivity by augmenting skills. Signalling theory by contrast represents 
education as a sign of productivity. To test these theories, we compare the 
coefficients of schooling estimated for the paid employed with those for the self-
employed. Since the coefficients of schooling for the self-employed are lower 
than for the paid employment there is apparently a small element of signalling. 
But the bulk of the return to schooling is a consequence of enhanced human 
capital. Although Chow tests (table 4) reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
regression coefficients of schooling in the two sectors, consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, the coefficients are sufficiently similar to support the 
position the schooling primarily raises human capital.  
    
The linear schooling hypothesis, underpinning the estimates of Table 4, is tested 
in the first instance with OLS estimates of equation 4, and presented in tables 5 
and 6.  Increasing and significant marginal returns to each level of schooling 
identify a distinctive feature of Pakistani human capital supply. The coefficients 
on almost all education levels are positive and progressively increasing with 
higher levels of schooling in all sectors . The exceptions are for females in paid 
employment at primary level and in agriculture at secondary and higher 
secondary levels.  
 
The coefficients at all education levels across all sectors of the labor market tend 
to be higher for females than for males. The apparent returns to an additional 
year of schooling at various levels (table 6) are substantially greater for women 
than men in both wage employed and self-employed sectors, though not in 
agriculture, except for the primary level. For agricultural sector males, the 
returns to education increase until the higher secondary level and decline 
afterwards while for females the returns are high at the primary level.  
 
These estimates are similar to the returns at different levels of Jamal et al., (2003) 
in Pakistan for the total paid employed workers, which were 3, 4, 16, 11 and 13 
for primary, secondary, higher secondary, tertiary general and tertiary technical. 
The present study, however, uses a different classification for educational 
attainment. Our interpretation is that high returns reflect the small number of 
qualified persons because of shortcomings in the lowest levels of the education 
system. Therefore simply expanding the higher levels of education to take 
advantage of the higher returns would not dig down to the root of the problem. 
 
Subject to two caveats, the observation that male monthly earnings in agriculture 
exceed those in paid employment is not consistent with an under-supply of 
educated manpower. The qualifications are about imputed returns to land and a 
possible agricultural premium for non-pecuniary disadvantages and/or greater 
costs in agriculture. The apparent high return for females is likely to be spurious 
for reasons already discussed.  Even so the increasing rates for males are striking. 
 
Table 5: Estimated returns at different levels of schooling by gender and 
occupation (OLS estimates) 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture  
Levels of 
education Male Female  Male  Female Male  Female  
Primary  0.057* 
(4.23) 
-0.073 
(-1.06) 
0.042** 
(1.93) 
0.063 
(0.55) 
0.087  
(0.94) 
0.558** 
(2.11) 
Middle  0.176* 
(13.36) 
0.237* 
(3.25) 
0.218* 
(10.23) 
0.204***  
(1.65) 
0.252* 
(2.73) 
0.706 
(1.49) 
Secondary  0.392* 
(30.97) 
0.569* 
(8.97) 
0.385* 
(18.66) 
0.494* 
(4.09) 
0.344* 
(3.75) 
0.247 
(0.52) 
Higher 
Secondary 
0.635* 
(39.17) 
0.851* 
(12.38) 
0.652* 
(23.55) 
0.762* 
(4.69) 
0.816* 
(5.29) 
-0.267 
(-0.26) 
Tertiary  1.042* 
(76.79) 
1.426* 
(22.62) 
0.978* 
(40.05) 
1.255* 
(8.61) 
0.938* 
(6.75) 
- 
NDW 0.014* 
(18.33) 
0.035* 
(11.85) 
0.008* 
(5.55) 
0.044* 
(8.03) 
0.020* 
(3.45) 
0.037 
(1.04) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(13.94) 
0.002* 
(7.65) 
0.001* 
(9.12) 
0.004* 
(3.46) 
0.001 
(1.36) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
R2 0.41 0.47 0.28 0.30 0.11 0.27 
F-statistic 1762.04  214.49 511.06 25.85 13.80 1.51 
Observations  30852 2950 16080 745 1404 52 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. T-statistics is 
in parentheses.  (-) indicates no observations. No education and less than 5 years of schooling is 
the reference category for education. Exp, Exp2, regional and provincial dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. 
Table 6: Rates of returns to additional year of education by level of 
education, gender and occupation 
Rates of return (%) 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture 
 
Level of 
education 
Male Female  Male  Female Male Female  
Primary  1.1 
 
-1.5 0.8 1.3  1.7 11.2 
Middle  4.0 
 
10.3 5.9 4.7  5.5 4.9 
Secondary  10.8 
 
16.6 8.4 14.5 4.6 -23.0 
Higher 
Secondary 
12.2 14.1 13.4 13.4 23.6 -25.7 
Tertiary  20.1 
 
28.8 16.3 24.6 6.1 - 
Source: Regression results (table 4). (-) indicates no observations. 
 
The magnitude of increase in coefficients with education levels is much greater 
for females than males. Returns as high as 20 percent or more can persist only 
because shortcomings at lower levels of education restrict the supply of qualified 
students for higher levels5. Since these returns are higher than earlier estimates 
they may reflect a disequilibrium, where labour supply lags behind expanding 
demand. Alternatively they may stem from estimation bias. 
  
4.2 Sample Selectivity Correction 
 
OLS estimates of returns to education potentially suffer from sample selectivity 
bias. Those working in paid employment are more likely to have received 
substantial schooling and chosen to be in that sector than in agriculture perhaps. 
Those in agriculture will have received less schooling. In this case the marginal 
return to education will have two parts, one due to its influence increasing the 
probability of the individual moving in to the paid employment sector and the 
other due to its influence on earnings in paid employment. So the regression 
coefficient overstates the education effect in paid employment and understates it 
for agriculture. 
 
We offset the sample selectivity bias by employing the Heckman two-step 
procedure and incorporating ‘lambda’- the selection term - into earnings function 
estimates. The selectivity corrected earnings functions reported in table A2, A3 
and A4 (appendix) include the standard variables – schooling, experience and its 
square, provincial educational expenditure per school age pupil, number of days 
                                                
5 A schooling squared term added to the basic specification of table 4 is positive and significant, 
consistent with the results of table 5. However the estimates of the other coefficients are not 
substantially changed by addition of this term. 
worked during the month and the provincial and regional dummy variables. 
Household demographic variables such relationship with the head of household 
(head) and marital status (married) are used as exclusion restrictions. These 
variables determine participation in the relevant occupation but do not directly 
affect workers’ earnings. Most of them are statistically significant. 
 
The selectivity term is large and statistically significant in most equations (table 
A2, A3 and A4) for males and females (in both years and levels of schooling 
specifications. A comparison of table 4 and A2 shows the effect of correcting for 
sample selection. Inclusion of the selectivity term in the earnings functions 
slightly increases the point estimates on years of schooling for males and females 
in the paid employed, and self-employed sectors . In the levels specifications, the 
inclusion of selectivity term has also slightly reduced the coefficients in most 
equations.  These findings suggest that, because of movements between sectors, 
OLS underestimate the return to education specifically for females in the years of 
education specification (though for other reasons there may be different biases).  
 
Experience and its square have a fairly standard relationship with earnings 
across all occupations for both male and female workers. For example, earnings 
peak at 30 years for males and 38 years for females in the paid employed sector 
of Pakistani labour market. 
 
We have also estimated Heckman two step procedure based on the selection of 
reported income and labour force participation for both genders and the results 
are reported in table A5 (appendix). The selectivity term lambda is significant in 
3 out of 4 earnings equations. These results indicate that female returns to an 
additional year of schooling are apparently higher as compared to males for both 
selections. Moreover, the results are very close to OLS estimates for the paid 
employed sector. These results are consistent with some studies of Pakistan 
(Aslam 2007; Kingdon et al., 2007).  Moreover, the convexity result is also similar 
to other recent studies of other countries (Kingdon and Unni, 2001 on India; 
Belzil and Hansen, 2002 for USA and Soderbom et al., 2005 in Kenya and 
Tanzania). 
  
4.3 Endogenous Schooling: Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
 
The household choice of years of schooling for an individual cannot necessarily 
be regarded as independent of the expected earnings of that person.  Aside from 
questions of ability, if earnings are extremely variable, then current earnings may 
dominate future earnings and the household may choose to reduce schooling 
when labour market prospects are buoyant. The perfect foresight underpinning 
equation (1) may not be appropriate.   In this case the coefficient on schooling 
would be a downward biased estimator of the true return. 
 
We approach this endogeneity issue by applying the IV procedure across all 
occupations, reported in table 7 and 8. The instruments are the problems of 
education/schooling (too expensive education; schools are too far away; had to 
help at home; had to help with work; poor schooling; parents did not approve 
and child are not willing to attend school)6 . Schooling is specified as a 
continuous variable7.  
 
The summary statistics reveal R2 ranging from 0.10 to 0.37 for males and 0.07 to 
0.41 for females across the occupations. The rates of return to an additional year 
of education for males are 12.8 percent, 11.3 percent and 7.0 percent in paid 
employment, self employment and agriculture sectors respectively. While for 
females they are 20.9 percent, 18.7 percent and -7.4 percent in paid employment, 
self employment and agriculture sectors respectively. The rate of return to 
education for females in agriculture occupation is negative probably because of 
the small number of observations.  
 
The findings confirm the previous section results that the apparent rate of return 
to education is higher for females as compared to males in both the paid- and 
self-employed occupations. Moreover, the  results are consistent with other 
studies (Aslam, 2007) that IV estimates are higher as compared to OLS in some 
cases. In that there is at least a one and a half percentage point difference 
between employed and self-employed sectors, the IV result supports the 
signaling theory for both males and females. 
 
4.4 Ability Bias: Household Fixed Effects (FE) Estimates 
 
The ‘nature and nurture’ bias of schooling return estimates is addressed by 
estimating a household fixed effects earnings function across sectors and 
genders. Identification of the effect of education on earnings comes only from 
within family variation among members in earnings and in education. The 
estimates are based on sub-samples of at least one worker within household who 
is related in any way (for example, father-daughter, mother-son, or husband- 
wife) or are siblings (only brother-sisters pairs). The results are reported in table 
A6, A7 and A8 (appendix).  For male paid employees there are almost 5000 
households and an average of about six male paid employees per household. On 
the other hand for self-employed females there are only 622 households with a 
total of 745 cases.  
 
                                                
6  Arrazola et al. (2003) used instrument variables conveying information about differences in opportunities 
to estimates returns to education in Spain. 
7 With few instruments for each sample, the ‘levels’ specification cannot be used in IV procedure. 
Focusing first on the schooling years specification, the fixed effects point 
estimates are lower than the OLS estimates in table 4 for all sectors (for males the 
returns fall from 9.2 percent to 8.5 percent, and from 8.3 percent to 5.6 percent in 
the paid- and self-employed sectors respectively, while slightly increase from 7.1 
percent to 7.7 percent in the agriculture sector). 
 
Table 7: Earnings and years of schooling for males (IV estimates) – dependent 
variable lnym 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables IV First stage  IV First stage  IV First stage   
School 0.128* 
(37.81) 
- 0.113* 
(14.28) 
- 0.070*** 
(1.72) 
- 
Exp 0.061* 
(56.78) 
-0.017* 
(-2.72) 
0.057* 
(31.86) 
-0.080* 
(-10.28) 
0.056* 
(6.07) 
-0.111* 
(-4.59) 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-33.27) 
-0.001* 
(-9.24) 
-0.001* 
(-21.30) 
-0.00002  
(--0.19) 
-0.001 * 
(-5.40) 
0.0006 
(1.54) 
NDW 0.010* 
(9.35) 
0.107* 
(22.71) 
0.008* 
(4.97) 
0.011***  
(1.62) 
0.021* 
(3.54) 
0.010 
(0.37) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(10.64) 
0.001* 
(5.94) 
0.001* 
(9.10) 
-0.002* 
(-4.33) 
0.001  
(1.44) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
dtooexp - -2.232* 
(-29.28) 
- -1.654* 
(-16.23) 
- -0.684** 
(-2.40) 
dtoofar - -1.879* 
(-9.19) 
- -0.967* 
(-3.79) 
- -1.588* 
(-3.09) 
dwah - -1.692* 
(-9.98) 
- -1.314* 
(-7.17) 
- -1.214* 
(-2.64) 
dhtw - -2.537* 
(-21.72) 
- -1.315* 
(-10.62) 
- -1.003* 
(-2.80) 
dpna - -2.491* 
(-11.00) 
- -1.707* 
(-6.55) 
- -2.200** 
(-2.78) 
dcnw - -3.092* 
(-38.08) 
- -2.145* 
(-21.63) 
- -1.578* 
(-5.90) 
Constant  5.915* 
(152.88) 
6.851* 
(30.97) 
6.277* 
(59.31) 
11.810* 
(37.05) 
6.032* 
(10.61) 
11.134* 
(10.65) 
R2 0.37 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.14 
F-statistic 1362.04 460.53 437.01 235.17 10.10 17.02 
Observations  30469 30469 15910 15910 1379 1379 
Chow test (F-
test) 
903..79      
p-value 0.00      
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. T-statistics is 
in parentheses. Dummy variables for provinces and regional dummies also included in all 
regressions. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Earnings and years of schooling for females (IV estimates) – 
dependent variable lnym 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables IV First stage  IV First stage  IV First stage   
School 0.209* 
(20.26) 
- 0.187* 
(5.68) 
- -0.074 
(-0.41) 
- 
Exp 0.075* 
(14.96) 
-0.099* 
(-4.89) 
0.035* 
(2.68) 
-0.216* 
(-5.60) 
-0.016 
(-0.24) 
-0.307* 
(-2.96) 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-7.26) 
-0.0002 
(-0.30) 
-0.00004 
(--0.14) 
0.002* 
(2.46) 
0.0005 
(0.49) 
0.003** 
(1.99) 
NDW 0.021* 
(5.71) 
0.142* 
(11.25) 
0.042* 
(7.05) 
0.045** 
(2.42) 
0.038  
(0.96) 
-0.065 
(-0.66) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(5.21) 
0.002** 
(2.29) 
0.003* 
(2.83) 
0.004 
(1.01) 
0.003  
(0.70) 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
dtooexp - -3.529* 
(-13.20) 
- -2.712* 
(-7.11) 
- 1.415 
(0.59) 
dtoofar - -3.015* 
(-7.57) 
- -2.315* 
(-4.07) 
- -1.353 
(-0.98) 
dwah - -2.360* 
(-12.33) 
- -1.752* 
(-5.94) 
- 0.252 
(0.33) 
dhtw - -2.910* 
(-7.42) 
- -1.360** 
(-2.05) 
- -1.425 
(-0.65) 
dpna - -4.096* 
(-14.33) 
- -2.288* 
(-5.49) 
- -1.384 
(-1.38) 
dcnw - -4.338* 
(-11.88) 
- -2.352* 
(-4.06) 
- -2.266 
(-1.04) 
Constant  3.565* 
(21.08) 
8.425* 
(11.97) 
2.129* 
(2.85) 
8.844* 
(3.61) 
4.504  
(1.12) 
15.446 
(1.34) 
R2 0.41 0.36 0.23 0.28 0.07 0.48 
F-statistic 194.98 118.99 27.05 21.39 1.04 3.33 
Observations  2830 2830 729 729 51 51 
Chow test (F-
test) 
23.12      
p-value 0.00      
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. T-statistics is 
in parentheses. Dummy variables for provinces and regional dummies also included in all 
regressions. 
 
These findings are consistent with the previous literature8. The decline in 
estimates may be because of an upward bias in the OLS estimates due to omitted 
ability and household human capital investment variables. It could also be due to 
                                                
8 In his study us ing South African data, Hertz (2003) finds that whereas OLS estimates yield returns of 
about 13 percent and returns to education are 3 percent by using FE. Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) also 
find FE estimates for male and female workers to be significantly lower than corresponding OLS estimates.  
schooling measurement error9.  The estimates for the ‘levels’ specification present 
a similar picture.  
 
The comparison of fixed effects estimates and IV estimates (table 7 and 8) reveal 
that the rates of return to education are higher with the IV procedure than the FE 
estimates for paid- and self-employed occupations for both genders. While the 
rates of return to education for males are higher by FE (7.7 percent) than IV (7.0 
percent) in the agriculture sector.   
 
We have also estimated household fixed effect with schooling IVs (table 9). The 
estimates are close to the IV estimators except for females in self-employment. 
The fixed effects (IV) results appear to imply that within households’ variation in 
female schooling does not affect their earnings, but between household it does. 
This is because there is little variation within households and most is between in 
these variables, in contrast to male schooling and earnings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Hertz (2003) corrects for measurement error in schooling using two observations of schooling on the 
same individual. This was possible because 13 percent of the individuals were re-surveyed in the sample to 
get measures of reliability of schooling. However, he still finds the return to education to be lower 
than OLS. The correction for ME raises the estimates over the uncorrected ones.  Data constraints 
prevent such a correction in the current paper. 
Table 9: Earnings and years of schooling: controlling for household fixed 
effects (with schooling IVs)– dependent variable lnym 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables Male Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
School 0.120* 
(30.82) 
0.235* 
(8.21) 
0.094* 
(9.85) 
-0.006 
(-0.04) 
0.064  
(0.98) 
 
- 
Exp 0.058* 
(51.67) 
0.070* 
(7.94) 
0.046* 
(23.11) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.036* 
(2.51) 
 
- 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-30.08) 
-0.001* 
(-3.74) 
-0.001* 
(-15.61) 
0.0002 
(0.42) 
-0.001 *** 
(-1.87) 
 
- 
NWD 0.011* 
(10.99) 
0.016* 
(2.47) 
0.010 
(5.73) 
0.041* 
(2.55) 
0.004  
(0.33) 
 
- 
EDUEXP  0.027 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
 
- 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.00) 
 
- 
Rural   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Constant  -14.462 
(-0.00) 
-1.011 
(-0.00) 
6.868* 
(66.87) 
4.555* 
(0.00) 
-0.666 
(-0.00) 
 
- 
R2(within) 0.31 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.08 - 
R2(between) 0.04 0.40 0.27 0.15 0.0007  
R2(overall) 0.04 0.39 0.23 0.15 0.0004  
Wald chi2 6555.61 187.39 3.01 16.81 7.64 - 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.18  
Observations  30469 2830 15910 729 1379 - 
No. groups 4981 1811 4560 609 1010 - 
F-test  that all 
u_i=0  
1.56 1.00 1.76 2.40 1.31 - 
p-value 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Note: ** and * represent significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. T -statistics is in 
parentheses.  (-) indicates no observations. Dummy variables for provinces also included in all 
regressions. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There is some signaling in Pakistani education investment but mainly the 
education is productivity-enhancing investment in human capital, according to a 
comparison of self-employed and paid employed earnings equations. Returns to 
public spending of education are extremely high, suggesting very considerable 
state underinvestment.  This most probably accounts for the increasing returns 
with higher levels of schooling (which are difficult to square with the Mincer 
assumptions). Inadequate primary education reduces the numbers able to take 
advantage of secondary education, and so on through the levels of education. 
 
 Instrumental variable (IV) correction for endogenous schooling raises estimated 
returns to schooling, while household fixed effects, which are presumed to 
control for ability, reduce the measured return. The IV effect implies a negative 
association of schooling with earnings, which seems contrary to the simple 
Mincer model.  
 
Low labour force participation of women must be a contributor to the apparently 
high measured returns to female schooling. Indeed this low participation is likely 
to reduce the private financial returns below that of males. It would therefore be 
mistaken to recommend more investment in female education simply on the 
basis of high returns.  The policy challenge is in the low wages and high 
education in the female paid employment sector, and the low participation rate. 
These reduce the private financial returns to female education and therefore the 
private incentive to invest. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition of Variables used in the Study  
Variable Description 
EXP Experience (age-schooling-5) 
EXP2 Square of experience 
lnym Log of monthly earnings from main occupation 
married Equals 1 if individual is married, 0 otherwise 
rural Equals 1 if the individual is from rural area, 0 otherwise 
Punjab Equals 1 if the individual is from Punjab province, 0 otherwise 
Sindh Equals 1 if the individual is from Sindh province, 0 otherwise 
NWFP Equals 1 if the individual is from NWFP province, 0 otherwise 
Baloch Equals 1 if the individual is from Balochistan province, 0 otherwise 
school Number of years of education acquired 
No school Equals 1 if individual reports 0 years of education   
Less_primary Equals 1 if individual has completed less than 5 years of education that class 
1, 2, 3 or 4, 0 otherwise 
prim Equal 1 if individual has completed 5 years of schooling, 0 otherwise 
mid Equals 1 if individual has completed 6, 7 or 8  years of schooling, 0 otherwise  
sec Equals 1 if individual has completed 9 or 10 years of schooling, 0 otherwise 
hsec Equals 1 if individual has completed  11 or 12 years of schooling, 0 otherwise 
ter Equals 1 if individual has completed 13 years of education or more, 0 
otherwise 
lit Equals 1 if individual can read or write in any language with understanding, 
0 otherwise 
num Equals 1 if individual can solve simple (plus minus)  sums, 0 otherwise 
dtooexp Equals 1 if education is too expensive, 0 otherwise 
dtoofar Equals 1 if schools are too far, 0 otherwise 
dwah Equals 1 if doing working at home, 0 otherwise 
dhtw Equals 1 if helping at work, 0 otherwise 
dpna Equals 1 if parent did not allow to go to school, 0 otherwise 
dcnw Equals 1 if child is not willing to go to school, 0 otherwise. 
NWD Number of days worked during last month 
EDUEXP Provincial education expenditure per school age pupil 
 
 
 
Table A2: Earnings and years of schooling (Hickman two-step estimates) – 
dependent variable lnym 
 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables Male Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
School 0.103* 
(70.11) 
0.183* 
(16.15) 
0.091* 
(37.39) 
0.226* 
(2.97) 
0.077* 
(7.50) 
0.018 
(0.29) 
Exp 0.060* 
(45.58) 
0.075* 
(14.28) 
0.046* 
(17.57) 
0.022 
(1.51) 
0.057* 
(6.81) 
0.027 
(0.66) 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-34.12) 
-0.001* 
(-8.33) 
-0.001* 
(-15.05) 
0.0002 
(0.48) 
-0.001 * 
(-5.56) 
-0.00002 
(-0.03) 
NWD 0.005* 
(4.20) 
0.039* 
(11.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
0.075* 
(3.81) 
0.020* 
(3.39) 
0.057*** 
(1.63) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(16.55) 
0.002* 
(7.38) 
0.001* 
(9.18) 
0.008* 
(2.87) 
0.001** 
(2.10) 
0.003 
(0.79) 
Constant  5.418* 
(79.40) 
2.252* 
(5.46) 
7.293* 
(48.51) 
0.132 
(0.08) 
7.359* 
(7.71) 
2.138 
(0.61) 
Lambda (l) 0.815* 
(12.53) 
0.921* 
(4.18) 
-0.823* 
(-5.66) 
-1.743*** 
(1.65) 
-0.679 
(-1.52) 
0.271 
(0.64) 
Uncensored 
Observations  
30852 2950 16080 745 1404 52 
Wald chi2  14588.98 1426.40  5255.14 443.30 1193.18 8763.91 
Pvalue (wald) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Z-statistics is 
in parentheses. Dummy variables for provinces and regional dummies also included in all 
regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Estimated returns at different levels of schooling by gender and 
occupation (Heckman estimates) 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture  
Levels of 
education 
Male Female  Male  Female Male  Female  
Primary  0.015 
(0.91) 
-0.010 
(-0.14) 
-0.010  
(-0.23) 
-0.320 
(-0.88) 
0.084  
(0.88) 
0.540** 
(2.22) 
Middle  0.140* 
(8.56) 
0.239* 
(3.18) 
0.154* 
(5.64) 
-0.074 
(-0.22) 
0.225** 
(2.32) 
0.659 
(1.44) 
Secondary  0.353* 
(22.43) 
0.441* 
(5.05) 
0.316* 
(11.67) 
1.085** 
(2.32) 
0.311* 
(3.20) 
0.192 
(0.41) 
Higher 
Secondary 
0.643* 
(31.95) 
0.651* 
(5.66) 
0.630* 
(19.37) 
2.137** 
(2.39) 
0.856* 
(5.35) 
-0.369 
(-0.38) 
Tertiary  1.145* 
(60.07) 
1.179* 
(9.15) 
1.069* 
(33.01) 
3.309* 
(2.46) 
1.043* 
(6.72) 
- 
NDW 0.010* 
(5.69) 
0.033* 
(9.91) 
-0.001  
(-0.59) 
0.087* 
(2.81) 
0.021* 
(3.46) 
0.041 
(1.18) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(16.23) 
0.001* 
(3.35) 
0.001* 
(9.31) 
0.010** 
(2.20) 
0.001** 
(1.93) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
Lambda (l) 0.761* 
(12.02) 
-0.568** 
(-2.24) 
-0.792* 
(5.61) 
-2.85***  
(-1.58) 
-0.619 
(-1.41) 
0.108 
(0.28) 
Uncensored 
Observations  
30852 2950 16080 745 1404 52 
Wald chi2  15809.63 1480.25 5880.98  423.72 1209.08 8713.54 
Pvalue 
(wald) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Z-statistics is 
in parentheses.  (-) indicates no observations. No education and less than 5 years of schooling is 
the reference category for education. Exp, Exp2, regional and provincial dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. 
 
Table A4: Rates of returns to additional year of education by level of 
education, gender and occupation (Heckman procedure) 
Rates of return (%) 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture 
 
Level of 
education 
Male Female  Male  Female Male Female  
Primary  0.3 
 
--0.2 -0.2 -6.4 1.7 10.8 
Middle  4.2 
 
8.3 5.5 8.2  4.7 4.0 
Secondary  10.7 
 
10.1 8.1 58.0 4.3 -23.4 
Higher 
Secondary 
14.5 11.0 15.7 52.6 27.3 -28.1 
Tertiary  25.1 
 
26.4 22.3 58.6 9.4 - 
Source: Regression results (table 8). (-) indicates no observations. 
 
Table A5: Earnings and years of schooling (Hickman two-step estimates) using 
selection of reported income and labour force participation – dependent 
variable lnym 
 
Selection for reported income Selection for labour force 
participation 
 
Variables 
Male Female  Male  Female  
School 0.090* 
(98.33) 
0.139* 
(35.72) 
0.088* 
(102.07) 
0.135* 
(29.85) 
Exp 0.062* 
(67.36) 
0.064* 
(14.86) 
0.062* 
(65.95) 
0.061* 
(11.71) 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-42.56) 
-0.001 * 
(-7.54) 
-0.001* 
(-42.05) 
-0.001* 
(-5.61) 
NWD 0.014* 
(19.63) 
0.045* 
(12.14) 
0.015* 
(12.15) 
0.026* 
(4.99) 
EDUEXP  0.001* 
(13.65) 
0.002* 
(8.24) 
0.001* 
(10.26) 
0.002* 
(6.96) 
Constant  6.189* 
(182.50) 
3.355* 
(18.95) 
6.207* 
(172.13) 
3.918* 
(17.94) 
Lambda (l) 0.298* 
(5.78) 
0.509** 
(2.34) 
0.208 
(0.75) 
-0.998* 
(-3.29) 
Uncensored 
Observations  
48410 3767 48188 3737 
Wald chi2  25999.01 2489 21709.56 1810.51 
Pvalue (wald) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: Earnings and years of schooling: controlling for household fixed 
effects – dependent variable lnym 
 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture   
Variables Male Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
School 0.085* 
(85.76) 
0.115* 
(16.10) 
0.056* 
(29.95) 
0.042** 
(2.02) 
0.077* 
(4.76) 
 
- 
Exp 0.059* 
(54.43) 
0.060* 
(8.49) 
0.044* 
(24.69) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.044* 
(3.20) 
 
- 
Exp2 -0.001* 
(-34.91) 
-0.001* 
(-4.96) 
-0.001* 
(-16.44) 
0.0003 
(0.60) 
-0.001 * 
(-2.41) 
 
- 
NWD 0.015* 
(17.24) 
0.031* 
(6.29) 
0.010 
(6.45) 
0.038* 
(3.29) 
0.008  
(0.73) 
 
- 
EDUEXP   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Constant  6.411* 
(253.20) 
5.288* 
(34.59) 
7.211* 
(140.99) 
5.895* 
(16.12) 
6.783* 
(18.42) 
 
- 
R2(within) 0.34 0.28 0.14 0.16 0.08 - 
R2(between) 0.47 0.48 0.25 0.20 0.08  
R2(overall) 0.38 0.45 0.22 0.21 0.09  
F-statistic 3356.41 107.75 463.04 5.44 8.40 - 
Observations  30852 2950 16080 745 1404 - 
No. groups 4987 1858 4571 622 1024 - 
F-test  that all 
u_i=0  
1.70 1.29 1.94 2.54 1.29 - 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Chow test (F-
test) 
887.66   1.80   
p-value 0.00   0.17   
Note: ** and * represent significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. T -statistics is in 
parentheses.  (-) indicates no observations. Dummy variables for provinces and regional 
dummies also included in all regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7: Estimated returns at different levels of schooling by gender and 
occupation- controlling for household fixed effects 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture  
Levels of 
education 
Male Female  Male  Female Male  Female  
Primary  0.053 
(3.71) 
-0.099 
(-0.83) 
0.040***  
(1.68) 
-0.260 
(-1.44) 
0.034  
(0.21) 
- 
Middle  0.144* 
(10.24) 
0.131 
(1.05) 
0.171* 
(7.45) 
-0.115 
(-0.59) 
0.132  
(0.85) 
- 
Secondary  0.353* 
(26.12) 
0.473* 
(4.13) 
0.298* 
(13.28) 
0.221 
(1.08) 
0.388* 
(2.49) 
- 
Higher 
Secondary 
0.576* 
(33.67) 
0.697* 
(5.68) 
0.466* 
(15.68) 
-0.301 
(-0.98) 
0.834* 
(3.57) 
- 
Tertiary  0.951* 
(65.25) 
1.132* 
(9.69) 
0.657* 
(24.37) 
0.237 
(0.85) 
0.821* 
(3.15) 
- 
NDW 0.015* 
(18.22) 
0.031* 
(6.27) 
0.011* 
(6.54) 
0.046* 
(3.86) 
0.010  
(0.75) 
- 
EDUEXP  - - - - - - 
R2 0.39 0.45 0.24 0.16 0.09 - 
F-statistic 1747.04  53.21 237.14 3.82 4.54 - 
 
Observations  
30852 2950 16080 745 1404 - 
No. groups 4987 1858 4571 622 1024 - 
F-test  that all 
u_i=0  
1.69 1.28 1.90 2.61 1.28 - 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Z-statistics is 
in parentheses.  (-) indicates no observations. No education and less than 5 years of schooling is 
the reference category for education. Exp, Exp2, regional and provincial dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. 
 
Table A8: Rates of returns to additional year of education by level of 
education, gender and occupation- controlling for household fixed 
effects 
Rates of return (%) 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture 
 
Level of 
education 
Male Female  Male  Female Male Female  
Primary  1.1 
 
--1.9 0.8 -5.2 0.7 - 
Middle  3.3 
 
7.6 4.4 -4.8 4.9 - 
Secondary  10.5 
 
17.1 6.4 16.8 12.8 - 
Higher 
Secondary 
11.2 11.2 8.4 -26.1 22.3 - 
Tertiary  18.8 
 
21.8 9.6 26.9 -0.7 - 
Source: Regression results (table13). (-) indicates no observations. 
 
Table A9: Summary of schooling coefficients by gender and sectors for 
estimation procedures  
 
Coefficients on schooling 
Paid employed Self employed Agriculture 
 
 
Procedures 
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  
OLS 0.092* 
(101.52) 
0.140* 
(35.58) 
0.083* 
(49.07) 
0.103* 
(10.11) 
0.071* 
(7.74) 
0.043 
(0.75) 
Heckman 0.103* 
(70.11) 
0.183* 
(16.15) 
0.091* 
(37.39) 
0.226* 
(2.97) 
0.077* 
(7.50) 
0.018 
(0.29) 
IV 0.128* 
(37.81) 
0.209* 
(20.26) 
0.113* 
(14.28) 
0.187* 
(5.68) 
0.070*** 
(1.72) 
-0.074 
(-0.41) 
FE 0.085* 
(85.76) 
0.115* 
(16.10) 
0.056* 
(29.95) 
0.042** 
(2.02) 
0.077* 
(4.76) 
 
- 
FE(IV) 0.120* 
(30.82) 
0.235* 
(8.21) 
0.094* 
(9.85) 
-0.006 
(-0.04) 
0.064  
(0.98) 
 
- 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. t-statistics is 
in parentheses. 
 
 
